Publication:
A review of security assessment methodologies in industrial control systems

dc.citedby15
dc.contributor.authorQassim Q.S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorJamil N.en_US
dc.contributor.authorDaud M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPatel A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorJa�affar N.en_US
dc.contributor.authorid36613541700en_US
dc.contributor.authorid36682671900en_US
dc.contributor.authorid57193904391en_US
dc.contributor.authorid7403523963en_US
dc.contributor.authorid57204109050en_US
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-29T07:26:50Z
dc.date.available2023-05-29T07:26:50Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.descriptionComputer crime; Crime; Network security; Power control; SCADA systems; Standby power systems; Cyber-attacks; Design/methodology/approach; Electrical power networks; Industrial control systems; Security assessment; Security vulnerabilities; Vulnerability analysis; Vulnerability assessments; Electric power system controlen_US
dc.description.abstractPurpose: The common implementation practices of modern industrial control systems (ICS) has left a window wide open to various security vulnerabilities. As the cyber-threat landscape continues to evolve, the ICS and their underlying architecture must be protected to withstand cyber-attacks. This study aims to review several ICS security assessment methodologies to identify an appropriate vulnerability assessment method for the ICS systems that examine both critical physical and cyber systems so as to protect the national critical infrastructure. Design/methodology/approach: This paper reviews several ICS security assessment methodologies and explores whether the existing methodologies are indeed sufficient to meet the cyber security assessment exercise required to validate the security of electrical power control systems. Findings: The study showed that most of the examined methodologies seem to concentrate on vulnerability identification and prioritisation techniques, whilst other security techniques received noticeably less attention. The study also showed that the least attention is devoted to patch management process due to the critical nature of the SCADA system. Additionally, this review portrayed that only two security assessment methodologies exhibited absolute fulfilment of all NERC-CIP security requirements, whilst the others only partially fulfilled the essential requirements. Originality/value: This paper presents a review and a comparative analysis of several standard SCADA security assessment methodologies and guidelines published by internationally recognised bodies. In addition, it explores the adequacy of the existing methodologies in meeting cyber security assessment practices required for electrical power networks. � 2019, Emerald Publishing Limited.en_US
dc.description.natureFinalen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1108/ICS-04-2018-0048
dc.identifier.epage61
dc.identifier.issue1
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85061306497
dc.identifier.spage47
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85061306497&doi=10.1108%2fICS-04-2018-0048&partnerID=40&md5=e7ba884317630a35bf273740834b2983
dc.identifier.urihttps://irepository.uniten.edu.my/handle/123456789/24767
dc.identifier.volume27
dc.publisherEmerald Group Holdings Ltd.en_US
dc.sourceScopus
dc.sourcetitleInformation and Computer Security
dc.titleA review of security assessment methodologies in industrial control systemsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication
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