Publication:
Problem of agency in Mudarabah contract

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dc.citedby1
dc.contributor.authorSapuan N.M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorRoly M.R.en_US
dc.contributor.authorid49964398700en_US
dc.contributor.authorid56958515500en_US
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-29T07:22:26Z
dc.date.available2023-05-29T07:22:26Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.description.abstractThis study evaluated agency problem in mudarabah (profit sharing) contract and suggests some prudent and comprehensive mechanisms to mitigate this problem from Islamic perspectives. Agency problem in mudarabah contract can cause a number of difficulties if there is no effective information transfer between the contracting parties. Full disclosure of information from the entrepreneur (agent or mudarib) that manages the fund on behalf of a capital provider (principal or rabbulmaal) can help to reduce misinformation and assist decision making. Some approaches that can be taken to avoid asymmetric information are compatible incentive contract, screening and monitoring process, shuratic (social learning) process and execution of Islamic code of conduct. This study highlights the roles of the Islamic code of conduct and shuratic process in mitigating agency problems in mudarabah contract. � 2019 Kolej University Islam Sultan Azlan Shah.en_US
dc.description.natureFinalen_US
dc.identifier.epage68
dc.identifier.issue2
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85087021656
dc.identifier.spage57
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85087021656&partnerID=40&md5=f36a35ed76eea4146278b48ab14ba7a9
dc.identifier.urihttps://irepository.uniten.edu.my/handle/123456789/24247
dc.identifier.volume9
dc.publisherKolej University Islam Sultan Azlan Shahen_US
dc.sourceScopus
dc.sourcetitleGlobal Journal Al-Thaqafah
dc.titleProblem of agency in Mudarabah contracten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication
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