Publication:
Measurement program: Investigation on cache-timing attack

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dc.citedby0
dc.contributor.authorKhalid Y.en_US
dc.contributor.authorDippel U.en_US
dc.contributor.authorYussof S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorid56355084400en_US
dc.contributor.authorid25824819200en_US
dc.contributor.authorid16023225600en_US
dc.date.accessioned2023-12-28T07:30:45Z
dc.date.available2023-12-28T07:30:45Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.description.abstractRecent cryptanalysis is able to reduce the strength of a cipher, without breaking the cipher as such, like in traditional cryptographic attacks. This is achieved by obtaining, and subsequently utilizing, some hardware information to recover the secret key or the message, or at least part thereof. This kind of attack is called side channel attack, and has changed the conceptual idea of cryptography from a black box system with a single input and a single output to a complex system, that produces plural, unexpected outputs, the so-called side-channel information in addition to the intended cryptographic output. This additional output can be used to break an implementation of a cipher. Cache-timing is one type of side channel attacks that is mostly done in general purpose computers. In this paper we are investigating cache-timing attacks, and show some experimental results that motivated us to develop a portable measurement program for such attacks. �2009 IEEE.en_US
dc.description.natureFinalen_US
dc.identifier.ArtNo5431494
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/MICC.2009.5431494
dc.identifier.epage192
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-77952215942
dc.identifier.spage187
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-77952215942&doi=10.1109%2fMICC.2009.5431494&partnerID=40&md5=01fabdeecb86a51025557d0da52d3fe1
dc.identifier.urihttps://irepository.uniten.edu.my/handle/123456789/29679
dc.pagecount5
dc.sourceScopus
dc.sourcetitleProceedings - MICC 2009: 2009 IEEE 9th Malaysia International Conference on Communications with a Special Workshop on Digital TV Contents
dc.subjectAES
dc.subjectCache-timing attack
dc.subjectMeasurement program
dc.subjectSide channel attacks
dc.subjectCryptography
dc.subjectDigital television
dc.subjectGeneral purpose computers
dc.subjectSecurity of data
dc.subjectBlack box system
dc.subjectComplex systems
dc.subjectMeasurement programs
dc.subjectSecret key
dc.subjectSide channel attack
dc.subjectSide-channel information
dc.subjectSingle input
dc.subjectSingle output
dc.subjectTiming attacks
dc.subjectTime measurement
dc.titleMeasurement program: Investigation on cache-timing attacken_US
dc.typeConference paperen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication
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