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Managerial overconfidence, government intervention and corporate financing decision

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dc.citedby14
dc.contributor.authorTing I.W.K.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLean H.H.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKweh Q.L.en_US
dc.contributor.authorAzizan N.A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorid57211409300en_US
dc.contributor.authorid15849147600en_US
dc.contributor.authorid55661469500en_US
dc.contributor.authorid55214819000en_US
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-29T06:12:43Z
dc.date.available2023-05-29T06:12:43Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.description.abstractPurpose � The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate financing decision and the moderating effect of government ownership on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and corporate financing decision. Design/methodology/approach � Pooled OLS, fixed effect models (FEM), and Tobit regressions are employed to examine the relationship between managerial overconfidence, government ownership and corporate financing decision of publicly listed companies in Malaysia for the period of 2002-2011. Findings � The authors conclude that: first, CEO overconfidence is significantly and negatively related to corporate financing decision; second, a higher degree of managerial overconfidence would result in lower leverage in GLCs, whereas the effect does not significantly exist in NGLCs; third, a larger ownership of government in a firm will reduce the negative effect of managerial overconfidence on corporate financing decision; fourth, the moderating effect of government ownership on the association between managerial overconfidence and corporate financing decision in GLCs is more effective than NGLCs; and fifth, government intervention plays its role as moderating effect on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and corporate financing decision in firms with lower ownership concentration but not in firms with high ownership concentration (more or equal than 50 percent). Practical implications � The finding implies that the moderating effect of government ownership on the association between managerial overconfidence and corporate financing decision in GLCs is more effective than NGLCs. Originality/value � The authors make the first attempt to test the moderating effect of government ownership on the relationship between ownership concentration and corporate financing decision. � 2016, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.en_US
dc.description.natureFinalen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1108/IJMF-04-2014-0041
dc.identifier.epage24
dc.identifier.issue1
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84955089226
dc.identifier.spage4
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84955089226&doi=10.1108%2fIJMF-04-2014-0041&partnerID=40&md5=79b204b48fe149a43d9ee3640d2e329d
dc.identifier.urihttps://irepository.uniten.edu.my/handle/123456789/22850
dc.identifier.volume12
dc.publisherEmerald Group Publishing Ltd.en_US
dc.sourceScopus
dc.sourcetitleInternational Journal of Managerial Finance
dc.titleManagerial overconfidence, government intervention and corporate financing decisionen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication
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