Publication: New differential cryptanalysis results for the lightweight block cipher BORON
dc.citedby | 3 | |
dc.contributor.author | Teh J.S. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Tham L.J. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Jamil N. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Yap W.-S. | en_US |
dc.contributor.authorid | 56579944200 | en_US |
dc.contributor.authorid | 57466943700 | en_US |
dc.contributor.authorid | 36682671900 | en_US |
dc.contributor.authorid | 14827620500 | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-05-29T09:37:39Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-05-29T09:37:39Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | |
dc.description | Cryptography; Gears; Probability; Security of data; Branch and bounds; Cryptanalyse; Differential characteristic; Differential cryptanalysis; Key models; Key recovery attacks; Lightweight block ciphers; Secret key; SMT solv; Substitution-permutation networks; Boron | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | BORON is a 64-bit lightweight block cipher based on the substitution�permutation network that supports an 80-bit (BORON-80) and 128-bit (BORON-128) secret key. In this paper, we revisit the use of differential cryptanalysis on BORON in the single-key model. Using an SAT/SMT approach, we look for differentials that consist of multiple differential characteristics with the same input and output differences. Each characteristic that conforms to a given differential improves its overall probability. We also implemented the same search using Matsui's algorithm for verification and performance comparison purposes. We identified high-probability differentials which were then used in key recovery attacks against BORON-80/128. We used 8-round differentials with a probability of 2?58.16 and 2?62.42 in key recovery attacks against 9 and 10 rounds of BORON-80 and BORON-128 with time/data/memory complexities of 259.18/259.16/224 and 2111.34/263.42/271 respectively. Our key recovery framework provides a more accurate estimate of the attack complexity as compared to previous work. The attacks proposed in this paper are the best differential attacks against BORON-80/128 in the single-key model to date. � 2022 Elsevier Ltd | en_US |
dc.description.nature | Final | en_US |
dc.identifier.ArtNo | 103129 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jisa.2022.103129 | |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85125237892 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85125237892&doi=10.1016%2fj.jisa.2022.103129&partnerID=40&md5=d7b1d0a629997cd62b74b8ee4f91ad5a | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://irepository.uniten.edu.my/handle/123456789/26899 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 66 | |
dc.publisher | Elsevier Ltd | en_US |
dc.source | Scopus | |
dc.sourcetitle | Journal of Information Security and Applications | |
dc.title | New differential cryptanalysis results for the lightweight block cipher BORON | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dspace.entity.type | Publication |