Publication:
Compromising the Data Integrity of an Electrical Power Grid SCADA System

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dc.citedby2
dc.contributor.authorQassim Q.S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorJamil N.en_US
dc.contributor.authorDaud M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorJa�affar N.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKamarulzaman W.A.W.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMahdi M.N.en_US
dc.contributor.authorid36613541700en_US
dc.contributor.authorid36682671900en_US
dc.contributor.authorid57193904391en_US
dc.contributor.authorid57204109050en_US
dc.contributor.authorid6505975029en_US
dc.contributor.authorid56727803900en_US
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-29T09:12:09Z
dc.date.available2023-05-29T09:12:09Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.descriptionCritical infrastructures; Electric power plants; Electric power transmission networks; Infrastructure as a service (IaaS); Manufacture; Network security; Patient monitoring; SCADA systems; Water supply; Control and monitoring; Electrical power generation; Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) Attack; Monitoring and controlling; National infrastructure; Production facility; Supervisory control and dataacquisition systems (SCADA); Transportation network; Electric power system controlen_US
dc.description.abstractSupervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems perform monitoring and controlling services in critical national infrastructures such as electrical power generation and distribution, transportation networks, water supply and manufacturing, and production facilities. Cyber-attacks that compromise data integrity in SCADA systems such as an unauthorised manipulation of sensor or control signals could have a severe impact on the operation of the critical national infrastructure as it misleads system operators into making wrong decisions. This work investigates the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack that aims explicitly at compromising data integrity of SCADA systems. The IEC 60870-5-104 tele-control communication protocol is used as the subject focus because it is a commonly used communication protocol in electrical power SCADA systems for tele-control and monitoring. We conducted several MITM attacks: covering the capturing, modification and injection of control commands, on IEC 60870-5-104 in our power grid SCADA system testbed. We described and performed the attacks in detail, together with several use cases. Based on the Proof-of-Concept (POC) conducted and data that we gathered, it shows that IEC 60870-5-104 is vulnerable against MITM attacks and it can be an entry point of cyberattacks, be it sophisticated or otherwise. � 2021, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.en_US
dc.description.natureFinalen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-981-33-6835-4_40
dc.identifier.epage626
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85101575520
dc.identifier.spage604
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85101575520&doi=10.1007%2f978-981-33-6835-4_40&partnerID=40&md5=e017201117fc54fac28ef3234f19541a
dc.identifier.urihttps://irepository.uniten.edu.my/handle/123456789/26571
dc.identifier.volume1347
dc.publisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbHen_US
dc.sourceScopus
dc.sourcetitleCommunications in Computer and Information Science
dc.titleCompromising the Data Integrity of an Electrical Power Grid SCADA Systemen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication
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